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FIELDS v. SPEAKER OF PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”
–Justice William J. Brennan1
 The concept of a separation of religion from government was fundamental to the 
Founding Fathers’ attempt to prevent the U.S. federal government from coercing 
individuals into practicing a particular religion.2 However, the American concept of 
maintaining the separation of church and state has never meant that there must be an 
absolute separation of religion from government in all situations.3 The U.S. Constitution 
allows the federal government to incorporate religious expression into certain public 
acts to recognize the religious heritage and culture of the American people.4 
Accordingly, Executive Orders5 have designated religious holidays as national holidays, 
an Act of Congress6 codified the President’s ability to proclaim a National Day of 
Prayer, and Presidential Proclamations7 have commemorated religious holidays and 
festivals.8 The federal government is also permitted to publicly acknowledge the 
religious beliefs and practices of the American people when it invites or hires a chaplain 
to offer a prayer before a governmental lawmaking session to solemnize the occasion.9 
1. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
2. See Derek H. Davis, Law, the U.S. Supreme Court, and Religion, Oxford Research Encyclopedia 5 
(Aug. 2016), https://oxfordre.com/religion/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-
9780199340378-e-449 (“The Establishment Clause was the founders’ attempt to end government’s 
coercive role in directing the religious course of citizens’ lives . . . .”).
3. See id. (“[T]he American tradition of separation of church and state does not mean that a separation of 
religion from government is required in all cases.”).
4. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[The Court has] noted that 
government cannot be completely prohibited from recognizing in its public actions the religious beliefs 
and practices of the American people as an aspect of our national history and culture.”).
5. An Executive Order is “a signed, written, and published directive from the President of the United 
States that manages operations of the federal government.” What is an Executive Order?, A.B.A. (Oct. 9, 
2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/teaching-legal-docs/what-
is-an-executive-order-/.
6. An Act of Congress is “[a] statute that is formally enacted in accordance with the legislative power 
granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution.” Act of Congress, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 
2019). Prior to becoming an Act of Congress, the bill or resolution must pass in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. Id. The National Day of Prayer Act, passed by Congress in 1998, 
requires the President to “issue each year a proclamation designating the first Thursday in May as a 
National Day of Prayer on which the people of the United States may turn to God in prayer and 
meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals.” 36 U.S.C. § 119.
7. A Presidential Proclamation is an announcement of policy from the President. Presidential Proclamations, 
Geo. L. Libr. https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=365454&p=2468883 (last visited Feb. 10, 
2021). “The vast majority of proclamations are issued to announce and support a ceremonial event, such 
as National African American History Month or National Hurricane Awareness Week.” Id.
8. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676–77.
9. See id. at 692–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[S]uch governmental ‘acknowledgements’ of religion as 
legislative prayers . . . [and] government declaration of Thanksgiving as a public holiday . . . serve . . . 
the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions . . . .”).
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These “legislative prayers” are intended to lend gravity to the lawmaking practice and 
inspire legislators to work together for the common good.10
 Since 1789, with the exception of a brief period in the middle of the nineteenth 
century,11 paid chaplains have regularly offered legislative prayers to open lawmaking 
sessions in both chambers of the U.S. Congress.12 The first guest chaplains—unpaid 
local ministers—were invited to open congressional sessions in 1855.13 Since then, 
the Senate and the House of Representatives have hosted guest chaplains from all 
the world’s major religions.14
 In 2019, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Eleventh circuits applied 
Supreme Court precedent, established in Marsh v. Chambers15 and Town of Greece v. 
Galloway,16 to address the constitutionality of restrictions on the legislative prayer 
practices of state legislatures and determine whether the U.S. Constitution permits a 
state legislature to categorically exclude all persons belonging to religious sects that do 
not profess a belief in a divine being or God from its guest chaplain programs.17 The 
Eleventh Circuit, in Williamson v. Brevard County, held that such a restrictive practice 
violates the Establishment Clause.18 However, in Fields v. Speaker of Pennsylvania 
10. See Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 
U.S. 565, 575 (2014)) (stating that legislative prayer is a “symbolic expression” that merely “lends gravity 
to public business, reminds lawmakers to transcend petty differences in pursuit of a higher purpose, and 
expresses a common aspiration to a just and peaceful society”).
11. See Ida A. Brudnick, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R41807, House and Senate Chaplains: An Overview 2 
(2011) (explaining that, in December 1857, both the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives 
resolved to invite local clergy to officiate as unpaid guest chaplains in lieu of hiring official paid 
congressional chaplains, but were later forced to abandon the guest chaplain program when it became 
difficult to find chaplains willing to work without pay); see also S. Journal, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 34–35 
(1857); see also H. Journal, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 77–78 (1857).
12. See Brudnick, supra note 11, at 1–2 (explaining the history of U.S. Congressional legislative chaplains).
13. See Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1171, 1200 
(2009) (noting that after the Thirty-Fourth Congress opened in 1855, the U.S. House of Representatives 
passed a resolution to allow unpaid local ministers to offer opening prayers at House sessions instead of 
the institutional, paid chaplains that previously offered opening prayers).
14. See Senate Chaplain, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/
Senate_Chaplain.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2021) (listing the names and religious denominations of the 
chaplains who have served as the Senate’s chaplain, dating back to April 25, 1789).
15. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
16. 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
17. See Fields v. Speaker of Pa. House of Rep., 936 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Principally before us is 
whether the Pennsylvania House may intentionally exclude nontheists from offering prayers to open the 
legislative session.”); see also Williamson v. Brevard Cnty., 928 F.3d 1296, 1299 (11th Cir. 2019) 
(“Brevard County has selected invocation speakers in a way that favors certain monotheistic religions 
and categorically excludes from consideration other religions solely based on their belief systems. 
Brevard County’s process of selecting invocation speakers thus runs afoul of the Establishment Clause.”).
18. 928 F.3d at 1299.
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House of Representatives, the Third Circuit held that this practice did not violate the 
Establishment Clause, and thus created a circuit split.19
 This Case Comment contends that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit erred in Fields when it held that it is constitutionally permissible for 
Pennsylvania’s State House of Representatives (“Pennsylvania House”) to intentionally 
and categorically exclude nontheists20 from its guest chaplain program.21 First, Fields 
erred when it misapplied Marsh’s “history and tradition” test by not considering 
whether categorically excluding nontheists from a legislative guest chaplain program 
fits within the “history and tradition” followed by the U.S. Congress.22 Second, 
Fields erred when it failed to consider whether the Pennsylvania House’s categorical 
exclusion of nontheists from its guest chaplain program stemmed from an 
impermissible motive, such as proselytizing or promoting, discriminating against, or 
disparaging any faith or belief.23
 The Pennsylvania House begins its daily sessions with an opening prayer led by 
an invited guest chaplain or House member.24 Guest chaplains wishing to deliver an 
opening prayer must be a “member of a regularly established church or religious 
organization” and must be recommended by a State Representative.25 Pennsylvania 
House rules require that the prayer’s content help the Representatives “seek divine 
intervention in their work and their lives.”26 The Speaker of the Pennsylvania House 
at the time of litigation and his predecessor both interpreted this rule to necessitate a 
19. 936 F.3d at 147. A circuit split is “[w]hen two or more circuits in the United States court of appeals 
reach opposite interpretations of federal law. This is sometimes a reason for the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari.” Circuit Split, Cornell L. Sch.: Legal Info. Inst., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
circuit_split (last visited Feb. 10, 2021).
20. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit defined nontheists as individuals “who do not espouse 
belief in a god or gods, though [are] not necessarily atheists . . . .” Fields, 936 F.3d at 146. The U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania designated nontheists as “atheists, agnostics, 
Secular Humanists, freethinkers, and other persons who do not believe in a deity.” Fields v. Speaker of 
the Pa. House of Rep., 251 F. Supp. 3d 772, 775 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
21. Compare Fields, 936 F.3d at 154 (“[B]ecause history guides our inquiry in matters of legislative prayer, 
the Pennsylvania House may insist on traditional, theistic prayers.”), with Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1299 
(“[I]n selecting invocation speakers, the Commissioners may not categorically exclude from consideration 
speakers from a religion simply because they do not like the nature of its beliefs.”).
22. See Fields, 936 F.3d at 149–53 (conducting a “history and tradition” analysis of the Pennsylvania House’s 
preference of theistic over nontheistic prayers and its restrictions to religious prayer but failing to analyze 
whether specifically excluding nontheists from offering prayer is consistent with the “history and 
tradition” of the U.S. Congress).
23. See id. at 157 (stating that the court would not address the issue of whether “‘a policy of nondiscrimination’ 
is needed to render a prayer practice constitutional”). But see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 
(1983) (“The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where . . . there is no indication that the 
prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith 
or belief.”).
24. Fields, 936 F.3d at 146–47.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 147.
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categorical exclusion of all nontheists—those who practice any religion that does not 
profess a belief in a divine being or God—from the guest chaplain program.27
 The Fields plaintiffs are nontheists and are active adherents to the religious 
principles in their respective religious communities.28 The plaintiffs’ respective 
religious communities embrace religious practices and celebrations similar to those of 
a church or synagogue.29 However, their religions do not profess a belief in a divine 
being or God.30 When the plaintiffs requested the opportunity to offer an opening 
prayer at a Pennsylvania House’s legislative session, they were denied, solely because 
their invocations would not appeal to a divine being or God.31
 The plaintiffs filed suit in August 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania against the Pennsylvania House Speaker, its 
Parliamentarian,32 and various State Representatives,33 alleging that the House’s 
practice of categorically excluding nontheists from participating in the guest chaplain 
program violated the Establishment,34 Freedom of Speech,35 Free Exercise,36 and 
27. See id. The Speaker believed that when a religion does not require its adherents to profess a belief in a 
“divine being” or “higher power,” the adherents are “incapable of providing an opening invocation” that 
accommodates “the spiritual needs of the lawmakers” or that solicits “divine guidance for the benefit of 
the legislators.” See Fields v. Speaker of Pa. House of Rep., 327 F. Supp. 3d 748, 763 (M.D. Pa. 2018) 
(internal quotations omitted). The current Speaker and his predecessor also testified in their depositions 
that, in addition to nontheists, they would also reject guest chaplains “of other minority religions of 
which they disapprove, including polytheis[m], deism, religions that believe in spirits . . . , religions that 
do not believe in any god, and religions that pray to what the Speaker considers a ‘malevolent’ . . . force 
instead of a ‘benevolent’ one.” Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants Brian Fields, et al. at 13–14, Fields, 
936 F.3d 142 (No. 1-16-cv-01764), 2019 WL 913486. One Representative “testified that he would 
reject a guest chaplain who would not pray to the ‘appropriate version of [the] divine.’” Id. at 14. The 
deponents further testified that they would determine whether a proposed invocation was permissible 
by considering “factors such as whether the invocation mentions a supreme being, whether that being is 
‘benevolent’ or ‘malevolent,’ whether the invocation is a request or merely a message of praise, how long 
the invocation is, and whether it expressly contains words such as ‘let us pray.’” Id. at 15.
28. Fields v. Speaker of Pa. House of Rep., 251 F. Supp. 3d 772, 775–76 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (explaining that 
the plaintiffs are founders and ordained leaders in their respective atheist, agnostic, Secular Humanist, 
and free-thinking belief communities, none of which profess a belief in a divine being or God).
29. Fields, 936 F.3d at 147–48.
30. Id. at 148.
31. Id. at 147–48.
32. A Parliamentarian is “an expert in the rules or usages of a parliament or other deliberative assembly.” 
Parliamentarian, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002).
33. Defendants were named only in their official capacities. Fields, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 778.
34. The Establishment Clause is the First Amendment provision “that prohibits the federal and state 
governments from establishing an official religion, or from favoring or disfavoring one view of religion 
over another.” Establishment Clause, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
35. The Freedom of Speech Clause is the First Amendment provision that grants “[t]he right to express 
one’s thoughts and opinions without governmental restriction, as guaranteed by the First Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution.” Freedom of Speech, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
36. The Free Exercise Clause is “[t]he First Amendment constitutional provision . . . prohibiting the 
government from interfering in people’s religious practices or forms of worship.” Free Exercise Clause, 
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Equal Protection37 clauses of the U.S. Constitution.38 The plaintiffs sought injunctive 
relief requiring the Pennsylvania House to permit nontheistic speakers to participate 
in the House’s guest chaplain program and further sought to enjoin the defendants 
from discriminating against nontheists.39
 The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing40 to assert their claims,41 
and granted in part and denied in part42 the defendants’ motion to dismiss.43 The 
court dismissed the plaintiffs’ Free Exercise, Free Speech, and Equal Protection 
claims, but permitted the Establishment Clause claim to proceed.44 The parties then 
filed cross motions for summary judgment45 in the district court.46 In deciding the 
cross motions, the court found that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury47 
should the Pennsylvania House be allowed to continue its practice of categorical 
exclusion of nontheists and, on that basis, entered partial summary judgment in favor 
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
37. The Equal Protection Clause is “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment provision requiring the states to give 
similarly situated persons or classes similar treatment under the law.” Equal Protection Clause, Black’s 
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
38. Fields, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 778–80. The plaintiffs also raised additional Establishment Clause, Free 
Exercise, Free Speech, and Equal Protection claims against the House’s practice of asking guests to 
“please rise” before the opening prayer. Id.
39. Id. at 778.
40. Standing is “[a] party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.” 
Standing, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
41. Fields, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 782 (“We are satisfied that plaintiffs have standing under the Free Speech, 
Free Exercise, and Equal Protection clauses, and we will proceed to a merits analysis on these claims.”).
42. Id. at 792.
43. A motion to dismiss is “a request that the court dismiss the case because of settlement, voluntary 
withdrawal, or a procedural defect.” Motion to Dismiss, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
44. Fields, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 792.
45. A motion for summary judgment is “a request that the court enter judgment without a trial because 
there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided by a fact-finder—that is, because the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support a verdict in the nonmovant’s favor.” Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
46. See Fields v. Speaker of Pa. House of Rep., 327 F. Supp. 3d 748, 754 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (explaining that 
after the Free Exercise, Free Speech, and Equal Protection claims were dismissed, the plaintiffs 
amended their complaint to add additional plaintiffs and defendants, and upon completion of discovery, 
the plaintiffs filed cross-motions for summary judgment for the Establishment Clause claims).
47. Id. at 766 (explaining that to obtain a permanent injunction, plaintiffs must prove that (1) “they will 
suffer irreparable injury . . . ;” (2) “legal remedies are inadequate to compensate that injury;” (3) 
“balancing of the respective hardships between the parties warrants” an equitable remedy; and (4) “the 
public interest is not disserved by an injunction’s issuance”).
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of the plaintiffs and granted their request for permanent injunctive relief.48 The 
parties then filed cross appeals in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.49
 The custom of opening legislative sessions with a prayer began when the First 
Continental Congress50 hired Jacob Duché, rector of Christ Episcopal Church in 
Philadelphia, to serve as its legislative chaplain.51 In 1789—only three days before 
settling on the language of the Establishment Clause prohibiting the federal and 
state governments from establishing an official religion—Congress enacted a statute 
authorizing the appointment of paid chaplains who would, among other duties, offer 
opening prayers at its legislative sessions.52 Since that time, the Supreme Court has 
addressed the constitutionality of legislative prayers only twice—once in 1983, in the 
landmark case Marsh v. Chambers, and again in 2014, in Town of Greece v. Galloway.53
 Although the Supreme Court found the practice of legislative prayer to be 
intrinsically constitutional in Marsh,54 whether and how religious liberties are 
compromised within the sphere of legislative prayer remains a topic of controversy in 
the courts and academia.55 Neither Marsh nor Greece established a constitutional 
48. Id. (quoting Jamal v. Kane, 105 F. Supp. 3d 448, 462–63 (M.D. Pa. 2015)) (“[I]njunctive relief is ‘especially 
appropriate’ when First Amendment rights are violated, because money damages are usually inadequate 
relief.”). Since there was “no adequate legal remedy to compensate plaintiffs’ constitutional injuries, 
declaratory and injunctive relief will ensure that plaintiffs do not continue to suffer irreparable harm.” Id.
49. Fields v. Speaker of Pa. House of Rep., 936 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 2019). The plaintiffs also filed a 
precautionary cross-appeal to preserve the dismissal of their Free Exercise, Free Speech, and Equal 
Protection claims. Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants Brian Fields, et al., supra note 27, at 22.
50. The First Continental Congress was comprised of delegates from each of the thirteen American 
colonies except Georgia; in September 1774, it convened in response to new measures that the British 
government placed on the colonies. Continental Congress, History.com (last updated Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www.history.com/topics/american-revolution/the-continental-congress. The First Continental 
Congress “issued a Declaration of Rights, affirming its loyalty to the British Crown but disputing the 
British Parliament’s right to tax it.” Id. The Congress also “passed the Articles of Association, which 
called on the colonies to stop importing goods from [Britain]” if Britain continued to issue taxes. Id.
51. Brudnick, supra note 11, at 1.
52. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1983) (noting that Congress enacted the statute 
authorizing paid legislative chaplains on September 22, 1789 and settled on the Bill of Rights language 
on September 25, 1789).
53. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793–94. The Supreme Court 
denied cert to two subsequent legislative prayer appeals from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits. Chad West, 
Note, Legislative Prayer: Historical Tradition and Contemporary Issues, 19 Utah L. Rev. 709, 719 (2019). 
The cases that were denied certiorari dealt with legislator-led invocations which raise different issues 
under Marsh ’s “history and tradition” analysis than the guest chaplain programs discussed in this Case 
Comment. Id. at 716–17. See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Bormuth v. 
County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017).
54. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (“To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the 
laws is not, in these circumstances, an ‘establishment’ of religion or a step toward establishment; it is 
simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.”).
55. See Lund, supra note 13, at 1174 (“While the Marsh Court attempted to defuse the issues connected with 
legislative prayer, it refused to commit legislative prayer entirely to the political process . . . . [L]egislative 
prayer disputes have stormed the federal courts, law reviews, and the public consciousness.”).
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boundary limiting restrictions on legislative prayer practices.56 Thus, cases brought 
before the lower courts in the thirty-six years since Marsh continually challenge the 
judiciary to define the scope of constitutionally permissible restrictions on the 
content of legislative prayer and the selection of guest chaplains.57 These cases 
generally present one of three fact patterns: prayers led by appointed and paid 
clergy;58 prayers led by legislators or other government officials;59 or prayers led by 
invited or volunteer guest chaplains.60
 Marsh came before the Supreme Court in 1983, approximately forty years after 
the Court incorporated the Establishment Clause through the Fourteenth 
Amendment and applied it to the states.61 It was the first time the Court heard a 
legislative prayer claim brought against a state legislature.62 In Marsh, the Court 
analyzed whether the Nebraska Legislature’s sixteen-year practice of having a 
publicly-funded Presbyterian chaplain offer the opening prayer at the beginning of 
each legislative session violated the Establishment Clause.63
 On de novo review of the lower court’s ruling, Marsh declined to apply settled 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence64 to address the constitutionality of legislative 
56. See Greece, 572 U.S. at 577 (“Marsh stands for the proposition that it is not necessary to define the precise 
boundary of the Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific practice is permitted.”).
57. See Lund, supra note 13, at 1174 (“[T]he Marsh Court . . . has left lower courts struggling with a number 
of questions [including] whether certain types of prayers are constitutionally impermissible . . . and 
whether [the government] can pick and choose which religious groups have the opportunity to pray.”).
58. See, e.g., Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784–85 (legislative chaplain paid out of public funds).
59. See, e.g., Lund v. Rowan Cnty., 863 F.3d 268, 271–72 (4th Cir. 2017) (lawmaker-led invocations); 
Bormuth v. Cnty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017) (government Board member-led 
invocations).
60. See, e.g., Greece, 572 U.S. at 565 (invited clergy); Fields v. Speaker of Pa. House of Rep., 936 F.3d 142, 
146 (3d Cir. 2019) (invited clergy); Williamson v. Brevard Cnty., 928 F.3d 1296, 1298–99 (11th Cir. 
2019) (invited clergy); Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (volunteer clergy).
61. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (holding that the Establishment Clause prevents 
both state and federal governments from establishing religion). Prior to Everson, the Establishment 
Clause applied only to the federal government and cases decided in the federal courts, meaning that 
states and state courts were under no obligation to adopt similar laws. Id.
62. Amanda Voeller, Comment, A Leap of Faith: Questioning the Constitutionality of Texas’s Legislative Prayer 
Practice, 51 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 305, 315 (2019) (recognizing that Marsh was the “landmark case on the 
issue of legislative prayer”).
63. 463 U.S. at 792–93.
64. Prior to Marsh, courts routinely evaluated government policies and conduct for Establishment Clause 
violations by applying one of three tests: the coercion test, the endorsement test, or the Lemon test. See 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (coercion test); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (endorsement test); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Lemon 
test). Justice Brennan pointed out in his Marsh dissent that legislative prayer would have been found 
unconstitutional under the 1971 “Lemon test,” which identified three requirements that a law must meet 
in order to not violate the Establishment Clause: “(1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
(2) [the statute’s] principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and 
(3) the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Voeller, supra note 
62, at 311, 316 (internal quotations omitted).
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prayer practices.65 Instead, the Court explained that it would not conclude that 
legislative prayer constituted an establishment of religion when it was clear that the 
First U.S. Congress (“First Congress”) did not believe that the Establishment Clause 
forbade the practice.66
 The Court concluded that state legislative prayer was constitutionally tolerable 
because it would be inconsistent for the Court to impose a more narrow interpretation 
of the First Amendment on the states than the Framers imposed on the federal 
government.67 Consequently, Marsh carved out an exception to the prior Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence—the Marsh history and tradition inquiry—and held that 
religious prayer before governmental lawmaking bodies is inherently constitutional 
because of its distinctive “history and tradition” dating back to the First Continental 
Congress.68
 The Marsh Court then applied this “history and tradition” inquiry and held that 
the Nebraska Legislature’s practice of maintaining the same publicly-funded 
Presbyterian chaplain for sixteen years did not establish a religion because it was 
similar to the historical practice of the First Congress.69 The Court further explained 
that it might have reached a different conclusion had Nebraska’s legislature exploited 
the prayer opportunity to proselytize or advance any one religion, or discriminate 
against or disparage any other religion.70 Choosing a chaplain for one of these 
“impermissible motives” might have been sufficient to find that the Nebraska 
Legislature had violated the Establishment Clause.71 The Court cautioned that a 
65. See Voeller, supra note 62, at 316 (“The [Marsh] Court upheld the constitutionality of the prayer practice 
without employing any of the commonly used tests to determine whether an action violates the 
Establishment Clause . . . .”); see also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786–92 (noting that the lower court had applied 
the three-part Lemon test, yet proceeding with a “history and tradition” analysis of the legislative prayer 
practice).
66. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 789–91 (explaining that, because Congress settled on the Establishment Clause’s 
wording in the same week that it agreed to hire and pay Congressional chaplains, Congress did not intend 
for the Establishment Clause to forbid the practice of legislative prayer). But see id. at 816 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“The first 10 Amendments were not enacted because the members of the First Congress came 
up with a bright idea one morning; rather, their enactment was forced upon Congress by a number of the 
States as a condition for their ratification of the original Constitution. To treat any practice authorized by 
the First Congress as presumptively consistent with the Bill of Rights is therefore somewhat akin to 
treating any action of a party to a contract as presumptively consistent with the terms of the contract.”).
67. Id. at 790–91 (majority opinion).
68. See id. at 792–94 (“In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can 
be no doubt that . . . [legislative] prayer has become part of the fabric of our society . . . . [It] is not, in 
these circumstances, an ‘establishment’ of religion . . . it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs 
widely held among the people of this country.”).
69. Id. at 793–94.
70. See id. at 794–95 (“The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no 
indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to 
disparage any other, faith or belief.”).
71. Id. at 793–95. The Marsh Court reasoned that the evidence showed that the clergyman’s long tenure was 
not attributable to an impermissible motive in his rehiring. Id. at 793–94. He was reappointed simply 
because his personal performance and character were acceptable to the appointing body. Id. at 793.
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connection to a history of uncorrected constitutional violations would be insufficient 
to absolve a legislature of conduct that has since been deemed unconstitutional.72 
Accordingly, Marsh limited the constitutional boundary of legislative prayer to those 
legislative prayer practices that mirror historical practice without attempting to 
proselytize, promote, discriminate against, or disparage any faith or belief.73
 Thirty-one years later, in 2014, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Marsh ’s “history 
and tradition” constitutional standard in Greece.74 Greece upheld a New York town’s 
practice of inviting guest chaplains to offer an opening prayer at monthly board 
meetings by contacting clergy listed in a local directory of religious congregations.75 
The Court reasoned that although a majority of the prayer givers turned out to be 
Christian, there was no evidence that the choice of clergy stemmed from bias or 
aversion to chaplains of other faiths.76 The Court explained that, as a general matter, 
the U.S. Constitution permits both secular and non-secular legislative prayers.77 
Accordingly, the Court explained that the judiciary should not concern itself with 
the resulting content of the prayers, unless there was an indication that the prayer 
opportunity was exploited to proselytize, advance any one religion, or to disparage or 
discriminate against any other religion.78 Finally, the Court held that, once any 
governing body opens the legislative prayer opportunity to the public, guest clergy 
must be allowed to invoke the religious beliefs dictated by their conscience.79
 Together, Marsh and Greece establish the fact-intensive, three-step constitutional 
inquiry used to evaluate a legislative guest chaplain selection practice: (1) identify the 
essential features of the practice; (2) determine whether those essential features fall 
within the “history and tradition” of legislative prayer that the Court has found to be 
72. See id. at 790 (“Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of 
constitutional guarantees . . . .”).
73. Id. at 794–95; see also John Gavin, Comment, Praying for Clarity: Lund, Bormuth, and the Split Over 
Legislator-Led Prayer, 59 B.C. L. Rev. E-Supp. 104, 112 (2018) (footnote omitted) (“The Court has 
therefore established a fine line between reverence to history and faithfulness to the First Amendment, 
which requires courts to look to historical practices to establish the Framers’ intent, without relying 
solely on those practices.”).
74. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014) (“The Court’s inquiry, then, must be to determine 
whether the prayer practice in the town of Greece fits within the tradition long followed in Congress 
and the state legislatures.”).
75. Id. at 570–71.
76. Id. at 571, 585 (“That nearly all of the congregations in town turned out to be Christian does not ref lect 
an aversion or bias on the part of town leaders against minority faiths.”).
77. See id. at 580–81 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95) (“Marsh nowhere suggested that the 
constitutionality of legislative prayer turns on the neutrality of its content . . . . To the contrary, the 
[Marsh] Court instructed that the ‘content of the prayer is not of concern to judges’ . . . .”).
78. Id. at 581 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95).
79. Id. at 582.
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in accord with the Establishment Clause; and (3) determine whether the practice 
stemmed from an impermissible motive.80
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit relied upon this three-step 
constitutional inquiry in Fields v. Speaker of Pennsylvania House of Representatives 
when deciding the parties’ cross appeals in 2019.81 In its cross-appeal,82 the 
Pennsylvania House argued that the district court erred in finding that the House’s 
legislative prayer practices violated the Establishment Clause because an explicit 
preference for “traditional religious prayer” does not establish a religion under Marsh 
or Greece.83 The Pennsylvania House further argued that Greece does not require 
inclusion of nontheists in legislative prayers because the Supreme Court has defined 
legislative prayer as a “solicitation of Divine guidance.”84 Finally, the Pennsylvania 
House argued that it is constitutionally permissible to discriminate in favor of two or 
more individual religions85 because such a practice would be more inclusive than the 
primarily-Christian legislative prayer practice upheld in Marsh.86
 The plaintiffs argued in their cross-appeal that the district court correctly held 
that the Pennsylvania House’s guest chaplain selection process violated the 
Establishment Clause under Greece because the process advanced theism by 
intentionally discriminating against nontheists.87 The plaintiffs further argued that 
Greece did not limit its prohibition against discrimination in the guest chaplain 
selection process to discrimination that prefers a single religion.88
 The Third Circuit held in Fields that the Pennsylvania House’s intentional and 
categorical exclusion of nontheists from the guest chaplain selection program did not 
80. See id. at 577, 581 (examining whether the features of Greece’s prayer practice fit within the tradition of 
Congress and state legislatures and whether the practice stemmed from an impermissible motive); see 
also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793–94 (1983) (analyzing whether hiring the Presbyterian 
chaplain for sixteen years fit within the tradition of the legislative prayer and whether such employment 
of the chaplain stemmed from an impermissible motive). See also Gavin, supra note 73, at 117 (“The fact 
sensitive nature of [the Establishment Clause] analysis, which was recognized in Town of Greece, . . . 
necessitates an in depth analysis of all of the facts surrounding a challenged practice . . . .”).
81. 936 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 2019).
82. A cross-appeal is “[a]n appeal by the appellee, usually heard at the same time as the appellant’s appeal.” 
Cross-Appeal, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
83. Second Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 2–6, Fields, 936 F.3d 142 (No. 1-16-cv-01764), 2019 
WL 1568018.
84. See id. at 4 (emphasis omitted) (“[A]ccepting appellees’ arguments means this Court . . . . [m]ust accept 
that Greece requires nonbeliever inclusion in a practice the Supreme Court has repeatedly described as 
a solicitation of ‘Divine guidance’ . . . . [A]ppellees’ arguments fail—often spectacularly—in theory and 
practice . . . .”).
85. The House referred to this idea as the “two-sect rule.” Fields, 936 F.3d at 154.
86. See id. (“The House . . . urges that ‘[h]istory confirms the constitutionality of prayer practices far more 
exclusive’ than the theists-only rule . . . . [because] by approving the sole use of a chaplain from a single 
sect for 16 years, Marsh was even more exclusive.”).
87. Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants Brian Fields, et al. at 25–28, Fields, 936 F.3d 142 (No. 1-16-cv-
01764), 2019 WL 993956.
88. Id. at 29.
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violate the Establishment Clause because only theistic invocations can satisfy the 
necessary goal of historical legislative prayer—the ability to solicit divine guidance.89 
The court reasoned that because nontheists are fundamentally unable to “offer 
religious prayer in the historical sense,” their exclusion from the guest chaplain 
program was not discriminatory.90 The court further reasoned that despite the 
Supreme Court’s prohibition against religious discrimination, it has never required 
that legislatures permit secular opening prayers.91 Accordingly, the court held that a 
guest chaplain selection policy resulting in only theistic prayers was constitutionally 
permissible, and the Pennsylvania House could therefore “insist” on theistic opening 
invocations.92
 In his dissent, Judge Luis Felipe Restrepo argued that because the majority’s 
formulation of the question at issue in Fields was overly broad, it completely neglected 
the defining feature of the Pennsylvania House’s guest chaplain selection process—
the intentional exclusion of prayer givers solely because of their religious beliefs.93 
Judge Restrepo explained that the intentional exclusion of entire religious sects or 
individuals who hold certain religious beliefs “has never been countenanced in the 
history of legislative prayer in the United States.”94 He further explained that the 
Pennsylvania House’s guest chaplain selection process unconstitutionally advanced 
theistic religions by lending the State’s “power and prestige” to the idea that God 
does indeed exist.95 Finally, Judge Restrepo stated that even if there were a connection 
between the Pennsylvania House’s guest chaplain selection process and historical 
practice, such a connection would be insufficient to cure the unconstitutional 
discrimination and violation of the Establishment Clause’s requirement that no 
religion be preferred over any other.96 Judge Restrepo therefore concluded that the 
Pennsylvania House’s process violates the Establishment Clause.97
 The Third Circuit erred in Fields when it held that it is constitutionally 
permissible for the Pennsylvania House to intentionally and categorically exclude 
nontheists from its guest chaplain program.98 First, the Fields court misapplied 
89. Fields, 936 F.3d at 151–52.
90. Id. at 153–54.
91. Id. at 157 (quoting Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2019)).
92. Id. at 154, 163.
93. Id. at 166–67 (Restrepo, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. Id. at 167.
95. See id. at 168 (“[W]hen, as here, the government subjects prospective guest chaplains to a litmus test of 
whether they believe in the existence of a ‘higher power’ or God, the government actively lends its 
power and prestige to the religious theory that a ‘higher power’ or God indeed exists . . . .”).
96. See id. (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968)) (“At its core, the Establishment 
Clause requires the government to remain ‘neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice,’ 
and the government ‘may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another.’”).
97. Id. at 170.
98. Compare id. at 154 (majority opinion) (“[B]ecause history guides our inquiry in matters of legislative 
prayer, the Pennsylvania House may insist on traditional, theistic prayers.”), with Williamson v. Brevard 
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Marsh’s “history and tradition” test by not considering whether categorically 
excluding nontheists from a legislative guest chaplain program fits within the 
“history and tradition” followed by Congress.99 Identifying the essential features of 
the guest chaplain selection process at issue is paramount to performing the proper 
constitutional inquiry under Marsh.100 Only when the essential features of the process 
at issue “fit[] within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures” 
will the court find the process constitutional.101
 Marsh held that the Nebraska Legislature’s process of maintaining the same 
publicly-funded Presbyterian legislative chaplain for sixteen years aligned with 
congressional tradition because the First Continental Congress and the First U.S. 
Congress similarly hired and retained clergy who continued to perform successfully 
in their jobs.102 Greece held that a town’s informal practice of selecting guest chaplains 
from a local phone directory comported with congressional tradition, even though 
almost all of the local congregations in the directory were Christian.103 The Court 
held that the town’s practice resembled a historical tradition of legislators tolerating 
and appreciating prayers offered by individuals of different faiths.104
 In Bormuth v. County of Jackson, the Sixth Circuit held in 2017 that a practice of 
choosing County Commissioners to offer opening prayers instead of chaplains fell 
within our nation’s historical traditions, even when every Commissioner offering the 
prayer was Christian.105 Bormuth reasoned that, absent an intent to proselytize or 
Cnty., 928 F.3d 1296, 1299 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[I]n selecting invocation speakers, the Commissioners 
may not categorically exclude from consideration speakers from a religion simply because they do not 
like the nature of its beliefs.”).
99. See Fields, 936 F.3d at 149–153 (conducting a “history and tradition” analysis of the Pennsylvania 
House’s preference of theistic over nontheistic prayers and its restrictions to religious prayer but failing 
to analyze whether specifically excluding nontheists from offering prayer is consistent with the “history 
and tradition” of the U.S. Congress).
100. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (“We turn then to the question of whether any 
features of the Nebraska practice violate the Establishment Clause.”).
101. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577, 587 (2014) (“The prayer opportunity . . . must be 
evaluated against the backdrop of historical practice.”).
102. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793–94 (explaining that it was immaterial that public funds paid for a religious 
chaplain to offer opening invocations because the First Continental Congress and the First U.S. 
Congress also used public funds for this purpose).
103. See Greece, 572 U.S. at 585–86 (“[T]he Constitution does not require [the town of Greece] to search 
beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing.”).
104. See id. at 584 (“Our tradition assumes that adult citizens . . . can tolerate and perhaps appreciate a 
ceremonial prayer delivered by a person of a different faith.”); see also Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist 
Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2088–89 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Greece, 572 U.S. at 577) (“[T]he 
specific practice challenged in . . . Greece lacked the very direct connection, via the First Congress, to 
the thinking of those who were responsible for framing the First Amendment. But what mattered was 
that the town’s practice ‘fi[t] within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures.’”).
105. 870 F.3d 494, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2017).
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advance Christianity, the historical pedigree of legislative prayer supported both 
legislator-led and clergy-led prayers.106
 The courts in Marsh, Greece, and Bormuth properly compared the essential 
features of their respective chaplain selection processes to historical practices to 
determine the constitutionality of the processes.107 The essential feature in Marsh 
was the sixteen-year term of a paid Presbyterian minister.108 In Greece, it was the 
town’s method of inviting clergy from a local phonebook.109 Although the town never 
excluded or denied the prayer opportunity to any religious denomination (including 
atheists), the vast majority of clergy who accepted the invitation were Christian.110 In 
Bormuth, the essential feature considered by the court was the choice to have the 
legislators lead the prayers instead of clergy.111 
 In stark contrast, Fields did not perform its “history and tradition” inquiry on the 
essential feature of the Pennsylvania House’s speaker selection process—the 
categorical exclusion of all nontheists.112 Instead, Fields focused its inquiry on the 
content of the resulting prayer.113 The court examined whether a practice resulting in 
solely theistic invocations was consistent with the Framers’ historical practices.114 
The court then explained that, because history has made clear that only theistic 
invocations can accomplish the traditional goals of legislative prayer, a categorical 
exclusion of all nontheistic invocations is supported by historical tradition.115 
However, Marsh ’s constitutional inquiry does not turn, as Fields concluded, on 
whether the content of the prayer delivered can fulfill each and every purported goal 
106. See id. at 512 (quoting Greece, 572 U.S. at 585) (“[T]here is no evidence that the ‘invocations denigrate 
nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach conversion’ or that there is a ‘pattern 
of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose.’”).
107. See Greece, 572 U.S. at 566 (“The Court’s inquiry, then, must be to determine whether the prayer 
practice in the town of Greece fits within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state 
legislatures.”); see also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792–93 (“We turn to the question of whether any features of 
the Nebraska practice violate the Establishment Clause.”); see also Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509 (quoting 
Greece, 572 U.S. at 566) (“Our first inquiry is ‘to determine whether the prayer practice in [Jackson 
County] fits within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures.’”).
108. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793.
109. Greece, 572 U.S. at 571.
110. Id.
111. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509.
112. See Fields v. Speaker of Pa. House of Rep., 936 F.3d 142, 150 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[W]e turn to two reasons 
why Pennsylvania’s practice is historically sound. First, only theistic prayer can satisfy all the traditional 
purposes of legislative prayer. Second, the Supreme Court has long taken as given that prayer presumes 
invoking a higher power.”).
113. See id. at 164–65 (Restrepo, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he majority, in my view, 
frames the Pennsylvania House’s guest-chaplain policy in a way that is too broad and that does not 
capture the true exclusionary nature of the policy.”).
114. See id. at 150–52 (majority opinion) (explaining that the “history and tradition” analysis need only focus 
on whether the chaplain selection process at issue results in an invocation that can achieve all of the 
goals of legislative prayer).
115. Id. at 150.
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of an invocation prayer.116 As Greece made clear, both religious and secular prayers are 
constitutional,117 and the judiciary should not be concerned with the content of the 
resulting prayer.118
 It is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s binding precedent in Marsh and 
Greece to find, as Fields did, that the U.S. Constitution permits the intentional and 
categorical exclusion of certain religious sects from a legislative guest chaplain 
program when the goal of the exclusion is to ensure that the content of the prayers 
offered fulfills all of the purported goals of an invocation prayer.119 The purpose of 
the “history and tradition” test is to ensure that the legislating body upholds the 
Framers’ model of government.120 There is no evidence of a congressional historical 
practice of excluding individuals from the prayer opportunity merely to ensure that 
each message delivered satisfies a notional laundry list of goals for an opening 
invocation.121 Accordingly, had Fields properly applied Marsh ’s “history and tradition” 
inquiry, it would have concluded that the Pennsylvania House’s process of 
intentionally and categorically excluding nontheists from its guest chaplain program 
is not constitutional because it does not fit within the traditions long followed by 
Congress and the state legislatures.122
116. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983) (“The content of the prayer is not of concern to 
judges where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize 
or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief . . . . [I]t is not for us to embark on a 
sensitive evaluation or to parse the content of a particular prayer.”); see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 
572 U.S. 565, 580 (2014) (“Marsh nowhere suggested that the constitutionality of legislative prayer turns 
on the neutrality of its content.”).
117. See Greece, 572 U.S. at 581 (“To hold that invocations must be nonsectarian would force the legislatures 
. . . and the courts . . . to act as supervisors and censors of religious speech, a rule that would involve 
government in religious matters to a far greater degree than is the case under the town’s current practice 
of neither editing or approving prayers in advance nor criticizing their content after the fact.”).
118. See id. (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95) (“[T]he [Marsh] Court instructed that the ‘content of the 
prayer is not of concern to judges,’ provided ‘there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been 
exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”); see also Marsh, 
463 U.S. at 795 (“[I]t is not for [the Court] to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to parse the content 
of a particular prayer.”).
119. Compare Fields, 936 F.3d at 150 (“Legislative prayer has historically served many purposes, both secular 
and religious. Because only theistic prayer can achieve them all, the historical tradition supports the 
House’s choice to restrict prayer to theistic invocations.”), with Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792–93 (explaining 
that the court must determine whether the features of the prayer practice violate the Establishment 
Clause when “[w]eighed against the historical background” of the practice), and Greece, 572 U.S. at 
577–81 (explaining that the court should determine “whether the prayer practice . . . fits within the 
tradition long followed in Congress and state legislatures” rather than determining whether the prayer 
practice’s content is neutral).
120. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786–92 (explaining why a “history and tradition” analysis is the appropriate basis 
for finding that legislative prayers are constitutional).
121. See generally Lund, supra note 13 (discussing the history of congressional chaplaincies from 1789 to 
2009).
122. See Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 23, Fields v. Speaker of Pa. 
House of Rep., 251 F. Supp. 3d 772 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (No. 1-16-cv-1764), 2016 WL 9340366 (“[T]here 
is no long, unbroken history going back to the First Congress of what the House does: inviting members 
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 Second, the Fields court erred when it failed to consider whether the Pennsylvania 
House’s categorical exclusion of nontheists from the guest chaplain program stemmed 
from an impermissible motive.123 Instead, Fields concluded that discrimination 
against nontheists was not the type of religious discrimination that the Court 
intended to proscribe in Marsh and Greece.124 In Marsh and Greece, the Supreme 
Court made clear that the Establishment Clause prohibits guest chaplain selection 
processes that operate pursuant to an “impermissible motive,” such as exploiting the 
prayer opportunity to proselytize, advance any one religion, or to discriminate against 
or disparage any other religion.125
 Marsh upheld the rehiring of a long-tenured Christian chaplain because there 
was no proof that the chaplain’s reappointment resulted from an attempt to proselytize 
or advance Christianity, or to discriminate against other religious faiths or beliefs.126 
Greece upheld a town’s invited-speaker selection practice that resulted in predominantly 
Christian speakers because the Court found no evidence that the town’s leaders 
intentionally excluded or denied any would-be speakers the prayer opportunity in an 
attempt to proselytize or promote Christianity.127
 In contrast, in 2019, the Eleventh Circuit’s Williamson v. Brevard County struck 
down a local Florida Commission’s invited-speaker selection process, reasoning that 
the process reflected an “impermissible motive” of an unconstitutional aversion to or 
bias against minority faiths.128 The Williamson court held that the Commission’s 
intentional and categorical rejection of polytheist, pantheist, and other non-
mainstream religions from a guest chaplain program exploited the prayer opportunity 
of the public to deliver invocations, while discriminating based on creed in doing so.”); see also Marsh, 
463 U.S. at 786–92 (explaining why a “history and tradition” analysis is the appropriate basis for finding 
that legislative prayers are constitutional).
123. See Fields, 936 F.3d at 157 (explaining that the court would not address the issue of whether “a ‘policy of 
nondiscrimination’ is needed to render a prayer practice constitutional.”). But see Marsh, 463 U.S. at 
794–95 (“[T]he content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where . . . there is no indication that the 
prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith 
or belief.”).
124. See Fields, 936 F.3d at 155–56 (“[A]s we have explained, a prayer by a Muslim is different in kind from 
one by a nontheist—different enough that a legislature may permissibly exclude the latter but not the 
former.”).
125. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585 (2014) (“Absent a pattern of prayers that over time 
denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on the 
content of a prayer will not likely establish a constitutional violation.”); see also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 
794–95.
126. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793–95 (“Absent proof that the chaplain’s reappointment stemmed from an 
impermissible motive, we conclude that his . . . tenure does not . . . conflict with the Establishment 
Clause . . . . The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication 
that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any 
other, faith or belief.”).
127. See Greece, 572 U.S. at 571 (“The town at no point excluded or denied an opportunity to a would-be 
prayer giver. Its leaders maintained that a minister or layperson of any persuasion, including an atheist, 
could give the invocation.”).
128. 928 F.3d 1296, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793–95).
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to advance certain monotheistic religions by intentionally excluding minority 
religions whose beliefs were not the “right kind” to offer invocations.129
 The Pennsylvania House’s legislative prayer guest chaplain selection process in 
Fields categorically excludes entire religious sects for the same reason that the Brevard 
County Board of County Commissioners categorically excluded entire religious sects 
in Williamson—because the excluded sects do not profess the “right kind” of religious 
beliefs to offer invocations.130 Nevertheless, despite these identical fact patterns, 
Fields came to a different conclusion than Williamson.131 While Williamson properly 
recognized categorical exclusion based solely on religious beliefs as constitutionally 
impermissible religious discrimination arising out of bias against certain religious 
sects,132 Fields concluded that this same categorical exclusion did not constitute the 
kind of religious discrimination prohibited by the Establishment Clause.133 The 
court reasoned that impermissible discrimination could be found only if the 
Pennsylvania House excluded religions that had the qualifications to fulfill the 
“necessary” element of legislative prayer—the ability to solicit divine guidance.134 
Fields held that discrimination against nontheists is not the type of religious 
discrimination that the Court intended to proscribe in Marsh and Greece.135 It 
reasoned that Marsh and Greece prohibited discrimination only against individuals 
who profess a belief in God and were not concerned with the protection of individuals 
who were unqualified to lead the prayer.136 Fields concluded that because the Supreme 
129. See id. at 1315–16 (explaining that the Florida commissioners exploited the prayer opportunity by 
“picking and choosing which religions to invite and which to reject,” taking “religious beliefs into 
account”).
130. Compare Fields v. Speaker of Pa. House of Rep., 936 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[B]ecause [Plaintiffs’] 
proposed invocations would not appeal to a ‘higher power,’ they were turned away.”), with Williamson, 
928 F.3d at 1299 (“Brevard County has selected invocation speakers in a way that favors certain 
monotheistic religions and categorically excludes from consideration other religions solely based on their 
belief systems.”).
131. Compare Fields, 936 F.3d at 149 (holding that the House’s prayer practice policy that prefers theistic over 
nontheistic prayers is constitutional), with Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1299 (“Brevard County’s process of 
selecting invocation speakers thus runs afoul of the Establishment Clause.”).
132. See Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1310, 1316 (“The selection procedures as practiced take religious beliefs into 
account, again favoring some creeds over others. By discriminating on the basis of religion in these two 
ways, the County has violated the Establishment Clause.”).
133. See Fields, 936 F.3d at 149 (“Because the House’s policy preferring theistic over nontheistic prayers fits 
squarely within the historical tradition of legislative prayer, we . . . uphold the prayer policy.”).
134. See id. at 153–54 (quoting Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2005)) (“‘[W]hether 
atheism is a ‘religion’ for First Amendment purposes is a . . . different question than whether its 
adherents believe in a supreme being.’ And only the latter question . . . is a necessary element of 
traditional legislative prayer.”).
135. See id. at 155–56 (“[A]s we have explained, a prayer by a Muslim is different in kind from one by a 
nontheist—different enough that a legislature may permissibly exclude the latter but not the former.”).
136. See id. at 155–57 (discussing the Supreme Court’s analyses in Marsh and Greece and distinguishing them 
from the facts in the case at hand).
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Court has never implied that legislatures must allow nontheistic prayer, the court 
need not concern itself with discrimination against nontheists.137
 Neither Marsh nor Greece limited the protections of the impermissible motive 
inquiry, the definition of “discrimination,” or the Establishment Clause’s acceptance 
of legislative prayer, to those religions that profess a belief in a divine being or God.138 
The language of the inquiry set out in Marsh and Greece ensures that government 
remains neutral with respect to all religions by presenting a clear and unqualified 
prohibition against the advancement of “any one” religion and the disparagement of 
“any other” faith or belief.139 Moreover, the absence of a Supreme Court mandate 
compelling legislatures to allow nontheistic prayer is hardly a constitutional 
endorsement of discrimination against nontheists.140 It is therefore inconsistent with 
the Supreme Court’s binding precedent in Marsh and Greece to find, as Fields did, 
that the U.S. Constitution permits intentional discrimination against nontheists in 
the context of legislative prayer.141 Had Fields properly acknowledged, as Williamson 
did, that categorically excluding nontheists from a guest chaplain program solely 
because of their religious beliefs was precisely the type of discrimination proscribed 
under Marsh and Greece, it would have held that the Pennsylvania House’s selection 
process violated the Establishment Clause.142
137. Id. at 157 (quoting Barker v. Conway, 921 F.3d 1118, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2019)).
138. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 581 (2014) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 
794–95 (1983)) (“[T]he ‘content of the prayer is not of concern to judges,’ provided ‘there is no indication 
that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any 
other, faith or belief.’”).
139. See id.; see also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95 (“[I]t is not for us to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to 
parse the content of a particular prayer.”).
140. See Greece, 572 U.S. at 581 (“To hold that invocations must be nonsectarian would force the legislatures 
that sponsor prayers and the courts that are asked to decide these cases to act as supervisors and censors 
of religious speech . . . .”).
141. Compare Fields, 936 F.3d at 154 (“[T]he Pennsylvania House may insist on traditional, theistic prayers.”), 
with Greece, 572 U.S. at 571 (“The town at no point excluded or denied an opportunity to a would-be 
prayer giver.”), Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793–95 (“Absent proof that the chaplain’s reappointment stemmed 
from an impermissible motive, we conclude that his . . . tenure does not . . . conf lict with the 
Establishment Clause . . . . The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here, there is 
no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to 
disparage any other, faith or belief.”), and Williamson v. Brevard Cnty., 928 F.3d 1296, 1315 (11th Cir. 
2019) (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95) (holding that the County’s prayer policy violated the 
Establishment Clause because it employed a discriminatory selection process, favoring some religions 
over others).
142. Compare Fields, 936 F.3d at 154 (“[T]he Pennsylvania House may insist on traditional, theistic prayers.”), 
with Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1310 (“[L]ocal governments violate the Constitution if they organize and 
conduct their prayers in a way that discriminates against other religious beliefs.”).
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 If the Fields principle were adopted nationwide, the 23 percent of Americans who 
identify as atheist,143 agnostic,144 or “nothing in particular” could be categorically 
denied participation in a ceremonial aspect of government that is clearly revered for 
its tradition dating back to the First Continental Congress.145 Confining the honor 
of guest chaplaincy to theists would communicate to almost seventy-six million146 
Americans that, absent an acknowledgment of a divine being or God, their messages 
of equality, unity, decency, hope, love, peace, compassion, tolerance, and justice are 
simply not good enough to warrant their participation in the government’s 
ceremonious prayers.
143. An atheist does not believe in the existence of God or any other deity. Atheism, Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary (2002).
144. An agnostic maintains a continuing doubt about the existence of a god or any ultimate being. Agnostic, 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002).
145. Aleksandra Sandstrom, Faith on the Hill, Pew Rsch. Ctr. 4 (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.pewforum.org/
wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2019/01/Faith-on-the-Hill-116-1.8.19.pdf (asserting that 23 percent of 
Americans are atheist, agnostic, or unaffiliated with any religious group).
146. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. Census Bureau (last visited Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.census.
gov/popclock/.
